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1
Introduction: Regulatory State
Building and the Transformation
of Statehood
In the post-Cold War years, but particularly since the September 11
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States (US), the developing state
and the functioning of its institutions have become primary security
concerns for policymakers in the world’s major states and multilateral
organisations. Initially, failed and fragile states were viewed mainly in
relation to humanitarian crises, economic development prospects and
human rights violations. However, in the course of the 1990s they
have come to be seen as constituting considerable risk to states and
societies many kilometres away, due to the perception that the absence
or poor functioning of governance structures of a particular kind
increases the likelihood of transnational risks, such as terrorism, inter-
national crime, environmental degradation and disease, to fester
unchecked within their borders and eventually migrate elsewhere.
Indeed, for many renowned policymakers and scholars, effective
global action to tackle governance ‘black holes’ and build/rebuild failed
or fragile states is seen as one of the most pressing issues on the world’s
agenda for the twenty-ﬁrst century. The September 2002 US National
Security Strategy paper turned conventional strategic thinking on its
head when it stated that: ‘America is now threatened less by conquer-
ing states than we are by failing ones’ (White House 2002: 1). Former
United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan (2005) said that
‘ignoring failed states creates problems that sometimes come back to
bite us.’ Political scientist Francis Fukuyama, who famously proclaimed
the post-Cold War era as heralding the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama
1992), has argued more recently in a less triumphant mood that ‘state-
building is one of the most important issues for the world community
because weak or failed states are the source of many of the world’s
most serious problems, from poverty to AIDS to drugs to terrorism’(Fukuyama 2005: xvii). Robert Rotberg (2004: 42) posited that state
building was ‘one of the critical all-consuming strategic and moral
imperatives of our terrorized time.’ Afghanistan’s ﬁrst post-interven-
tion Finance Minister, Ashraf Ghani, and co-author Clare Lockhart
have summarised the prevailing sentiment in claiming: ‘A consensus is
now emerging that only sovereign states – by which we mean states
that actually perform the functions that make them sovereign – will
allow human progress to continue’ (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 4). 
As such, there has been a massive inﬂux of practitioner and scholarly
interest in developing suitable and successful approaches to inter-
national state building. State building has to a considerable extent come
to replace or greatly transform the earlier concern in the post-Cold War
era with ‘building’ the ‘peace’ in post-conﬂict states and societies
(Bendaña 2004). Peacebuilding initially referred to interventions and
programs intended to turn violent conﬂict into peace. In contrast, state
building is a term commonly used to refer to the broad range of pro-
grams and projects designed to build or strengthen the capacity of
institutions, organisations and agencies – not all of which are necess-
arily part of the state apparatus – to effectively perform the functions
associated with modern statehood. While state building interventions
(SBIs) are in some cases deployed to deal with violent conﬂict on a large
scale (Barnett et al. 2007), this is not a precondition as state building
has taken on a more pre-emptive, risk management form than earlier
post-Cold War interventions.1 Indeed, the state building agenda has
now been extended beyond ‘post-conﬂict’ situations to be regarded as
‘applicable to a wide spectrum of developing countries, both in war
and peace’ (Bickerton 2007: 93). 
While policymakers, bureaucrats and policy-oriented researchers have
been busy conceptualising, reconceptualising and endlessly reﬁning the
theory and practice of state building, a substantial body of critical liter-
ature has emerged to question and challenge the validity of some of the
most basic assumptions of contemporary state building. Authors such
as Oliver Richmond (2005), Michael Pugh (2005), David Chandler (2006b),
Astri Suhrke (2007) and numerous others have produced powerful crit-
iques of the dominant interventionist paradigm, arguing that the ideo-
logies of liberal (or neoliberal) peace that underpin the objectives of
prevailing state building approaches are highly problematic. Reﬂecting
on the poor track record of these interventions in various parts of the
developing world, critics have concluded that SBIs are fundamentally
incapable of achieving their objective of constructing self-governing
and stable states.
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ProofDespite the abundance of both policy-focused and critical research,
this book has emerged out of dissatisfaction with existing accounts of
contemporary state building and its effects. As I elaborate in the ﬁrst
chapter, most approaches to the examination of state building, whether
critical or otherwise, implicitly accept the premise that these inter-
ventions are, or should be, about building the capacity of the state to
govern domestically. Therefore, the literature has tended to conceive and
evaluate SBIs in terms of their effects on state capacity or in some cases on
state sovereignty. Such perspectives are established upon static insti-
tutional, legal and procedural conceptions of statehood and thus tend to
downplay, if not wholly mask, the inherently political and ideological
underpinnings of all projects of state construction and reconstruction,
whether internally or externally driven, as well as the conﬂict-ridden and
dynamic nature of such processes. They also reify rigid dichotomies, such
as domestic-external, state-society, formal-informal and public-private,
that are drawn along formal institutional and jurisdictional lines. In 
this manner, the state building literature strips the state of the particular
historical context in which it – as well as commonly held perceptions 
of statehood and sovereignty – has emerged and developed, thereby fore-
closing the possibility that the state has never stopped changing. 
By focusing on the links between state building and capacity building,
state building and sovereignty, or capacity and sovereignty, the literature
on state building misses the crucial political nature of contemporary SBIs
– the ways in which they affect the distribution, production and repro-
duction of political power in intervened states – and is therefore unable 
to explain, rather than describe, the possible trajectories of such inter-
ventions. Even the most incisive and thought-provoking critiques of 
contemporary state building, such as Richmond’s or Chandler’s, end 
up essentially explaining what SBIs do not do – build a legitimate and
functioning Weberian state – rather than provide an analysis of what
form of political rule is actually produced through these interventions.
In contrast, the regulatory approach I outline in this book is from
the outset concerned with historicising and problematising the state. 
I seek to correct the somewhat mystifying and unhelpful disjuncture
between the literature on state building, which purports to have the
state as its main object of analysis, and the literature on state theory
and governance. Following Poulantzas (1973, 1978) and Jessop (1990),
I begin from the premise that the state is not an amalgam of institutions
and actors governing a particular territory, but a site of social and political
conﬂict. I argue that SBIs represent a new mode of governance, or a new
form of political rule, that rather than merely build the capacity of the
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Proofstate is in actual fact transforming the very nature of statehood in both
intervened and intervening countries, leading to the emergence of a
transnationalising and transnationally regulated state. This new, complex
and contested form of statehood does not ﬁnd adequate expression
within traditional readings of international relations and international
law and its true nature is obfuscated by the prevailing methodological
nationalism of existing accounts of state building, which take the state as
a given and its ‘performance’ as their object of enquiry. 
Contemporary SBIs are premised on the perception that the absence
or poor functioning of domestic governance institutions of a particular
kind represents an unacceptable security risk to the intervening states
and their societies. Therefore, managing risk in the longer term is seen
to require the ‘strengthening’, indeed the transformation, of domestic
governance structures and their outputs in intervened states. However,
despite the ambitious and far-reaching nature of such objectives, their
implementation rarely involves ruling intervened states directly.
Rather, SBIs are set up to shape political outcomes primarily by circum-
scribing the spectrum of political choices available to domestic leaders,
by means of transforming the governing architecture of intervened
states from within; that is, they seek to shift policymaking into trans-
nationalised or transnationally regulated spaces of governance opened
up within or near the domestic governance apparatus of intervened
states and into the hands of experts and managers who are not polit-
ically or popularly accountable. While such emerging governance arrange-
ments are inherently asymmetrical, in that they are structured to
privilege particular political outcomes and interests over others, SBIs
almost without exception preserve the formal-legal sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity of intervened states. In other words, rather than taking
over intervened states, state builders attempt to regulate the way their
governments govern. Indeed, SBIs are simultaneously found outside the
state, in the shape of more traditional forms of diplomatic-international
interactions and agreements between sovereign governments or multilat-
eral organisations. This unique ‘multilevel’ character of SBIs – within and
without the state at the same time – is important to understand and theo-
rise in order to make sense of the potential trajectories of particular inter-
ventions and the broader implications of this mode of governance for the
global order. 
Crucially, rather than manifestations of an already consolidated
post-Cold War global order – deﬁned by either Westphalian pluralism
or new imperialism – SBIs are part of the very process by which the
global order is being deﬁned, resisted, extended and modiﬁed. Because
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trajectories and limitations of interventions in the world’s ‘fringes’ is a
particularly useful way of understanding the dynamics of the emerging
post-Cold War global order and its implications for states, societies and
political agency more broadly. Indeed, this study demonstrates that
SBIs are dynamic and often innovative forms of rule that can produce
political outcomes that greatly diverge from those anticipated by their
planners and implementers. The ‘inside-out’ approach adopted here
stands in contrast to more prevalent ‘outside-in’ perspectives in inter-
national relations that seek to understand interventions and inter-
ventionism in relation to pre-conceived and static conceptions of the
global order and national politics. 
Examining SBIs as a novel form of political rule – or a new mode of
governance – that challenges traditional conceptions of statehood
throws up a set of questions that is mostly overlooked by the prevail-
ing tendency to examine these interventions in terms of their institu-
tional outputs at the national or in some cases sub-national levels of
governance. This book sets out to explicitly examine the ways in which
SBIs affect the production/reproduction and distribution of political
power in intervened states: Who rules? How do they rule? What social
and political conﬂicts are engendered or exacerbated by SBIs, and how
are they managed? And ﬁnally, what alliances and coalitions sup-
port or resist such power relations?2 It is structured to address these
issues by developing a theoretical and conceptual framework for exam-
ining contemporary SBIs, as well as by providing three case studies 
that each examines a different dimension of the ways in which 
these interventions transform the state – both the intervened and the 
intervening. 
After critically evaluating the literature on state building and outlin-
ing the theoretical premises of this book in Chapter 1, I proceed in
Chapter 2 to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the
complex governance terrain opened up by SBIs and its relationships
with other levels of governance, above and below the state. SBIs are
conceptualised as multilevel regimes – sets of social and political rela-
tionships, institutions and ideas – that exist simultaneously inside 
and outside intervened states. However, SBIs never operate in a social,
political, institutional and ideological vacuum – intervention regimes
tend to coexist and come into conﬂict with other regimes within the
state, which have different support-bases and ideational underpinnings.
Such conﬂicts may have transformative effects on all regimes within
the state and hence on the nature of political rule. 
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mode of governance has emerged. Four interrelated historical develop-
ments are identiﬁed as particularly pertinent – the perceived failure of
the UN-led humanitarian interventions of the 1990s; the evolution in
market-led approaches to development towards greater focus on the
state and the quality of institutions as determinants of successful devel-
opment outcomes; the ongoing transformation of the Western state
after three decades of neoliberalisation and the associated shift away
from government and the politics of interest-representation to gover-
nance and the politics of values; and ﬁnally, the supposed emergence
of existential global-transnational risks and the reorientation of policy-
making towards managing and containing risks of various kinds. By
relating SBIs to broader historical processes the third chapter demon-
strates that these interventions are not exceptional responses to crisis
situations, reﬂecting localised lapses in state capacity and governance,
but a new and dynamic mode of governance in the global political
economy that is transforming the state from within. In this way SBIs
constitute an important pillar in the architecture of an emerging anti-
pluralist, hierarchical and increasingly authoritarian liberal global
order.
In the fourth chapter I proceed to examine more closely the political
and ideological nature of SBI regimes, by interrogating the relationship
between processes of state transformation in the intervening states and
the kinds of actors – public and private – that participate in these inter-
ventions and their functions. In particular, I focus in Chapter 4 on the
role of what I call metagovernance actors, who are often concentrated
in the core executive of states and multilateral organisations, in pro-
viding the broad set of rules that structure diffuse intervention regimes.
As the discussion makes clear, whether public power is in the hands of
public or private actors is less signiﬁcant than the shifts in the location
and purpose of state power that we have seen through ongoing
processes of state transformation-neoliberalisation. These shifts have
led to the reframing of public policy, not as an inherently political
matter pertaining to conﬂicts between competing and often irreconcil-
able interests, but as a matter of ‘expertise’ and ‘good’ management. 
The following three chapters are structured as thematic, in-depth
case studies. The case studies are concentrated in the Asia-Paciﬁc
region, yet the processes I identify and the conclusions I draw from
these examples have broader relevance and implications, as I will later
explain. Chapter 5 follows on directly from the theme of the trans-
formation of intervening states and its implications for intervention
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formation and expansion of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) from a
domestic law enforcement agency into transnational state building as a
way of understanding the emergence of a new regional ‘frontier’ of the
Australian state, located within Australia’s neighbouring states of the
Southwest Paciﬁc and Southeast Asia. Within this new frontier, whose
ﬂuctuating outlines the AFP not only polices but also to a considerable
extent deﬁnes, Australian security is portrayed as contingent on the
quality of the domestic governance of the region’s developing states,
thereby creating linkages between the hitherto domestic governing
apparatus of the Australian state and those of other countries. This
allows for the rearticulation of the problems affecting intervened states
and societies – indeed, their very social and political structures – in the
depoliticised terms of the breakdown of ‘law and order’ and the absence
of ‘good governance’, which not only rationalises emergency inter-
ventions to stabilise volatile situations, but also delegitimises and even
potentially criminalises oppositional forms of politics. The AFP’s trans-
national policing activities also open up a ﬁeld of governance within
the apparatus of intervened states that exists in separation from inter-
national and domestic law, thereby leaving intact the legal distinction
between the domestic and international spheres and circumventing
the difﬁcult issue of sovereignty. As a result, police obtain discretionary
ordering powers, without dislodging the sovereign governments of
those countries. 
Chapter 6 focuses on intervention regimes. It examines the limits of
the interveners’ efforts to routinise political outcomes by constraining
the political choices of domestic leaders through the example of the
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) – an extensive
and expensive Australian-led state building exercise, under the auspices
of the Paciﬁc Islands Forum (PIF). RAMSI has often been lauded a great
success and a model for good practice for other state builders to follow,
in that its activities have managed to halt violent conﬂict and foster a
return to economic growth in the small Paciﬁc archipelago state. In
contrast, it is argued that RAMSI’s achievements are established upon
an unstable political coalition that has emerged due to the unsustain-
able availability of high levels of foreign investment in logging and
ﬁshing and a housing and services boom in the capital, Honiara, created
by the arrival of many well-paid RAMSI employees and contractors, as
well as upon the capacity of RAMSI ofﬁcials to mobilise superior coer-
cive force when ﬁssures emerge. Ultimately, I argue that rather than
providing a blueprint for good governance as it is meant to do, RAMSI
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those emerge.
Finally, Chapter 7 examines the history of international intervention
in Cambodia since the early 1990s, focusing on the development, char-
acteristics and interrelations of two apparently opposite regimes within
the state – the regimes of state building and patronage – as a way of
learning about the nature of the state forms emerging through the
heightened transnationalisation wrought by contemporary state build-
ing. Clashes between the two regimes have been common, at times
over contentious issues that threaten the central role of the patronage
system in determining the distribution of power in Cambodian public
life. However, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and his associates
have become adept at using the state building agenda with its empha-
sis on building ‘effective’ institutions as a way of displacing and trans-
forming social and political conﬂicts in Cambodia into technical
matters now framed and managed in the context of the ‘international’
relationship between the Cambodian government and its develop-
ment partners. Although the donors’ shifting emphasis since the late
1990s from political liberalisation to state building has presented
Cambodia’s ruling cabal with new challenges, primarily by opening up
non-competitive, ‘administrative’, channels for contesting arbitrary
executive power, it has also provided new opportunities for regime
consolidation. Indeed, the two seemingly conﬂicting regimes of patron-
age and intervention are highly compatible in their disempowering
effect on the emergence of meaningful political and civil oppositions.
This is because both regimes, implicitly or explicitly, advance anti-
competitive and hierarchical visions of social and political organisation
as essential for Cambodia’s stability and future development, as well as
act, in different ways, to curb unregulated political mobilisation. I con-
clude the chapter by arguing that since the conditions supportive of
‘effective’ governance, as it is understood by interveners, do not exist
in Cambodia and are unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future,
international state building, by attempting to take policymaking out of
politics and the political process, has ironically ended up strengthen-
ing a radically different and repressive political order. 
In sum, this study ventures beyond the dominant but ultimately
sterile preoccupation with whether SBIs are capable of achieving their
objectives or not by presenting and developing an analytic framework
that enables us to critically evaluate and explain the effects and trajec-
tories of these interventions. SBIs are examined as dynamic, new forms
of political rule in the global political economy that are transformative
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orated herein, we are able to determine how these interventions affect
key issues relating to the exercise and distribution of power in today’s
world: Who exercises it and how? Who supports it? And who resists it,
how and why? Ultimately, my investigation establishes that contem-
porary state building – whether successful or otherwise in achieving its
stated objectives – is associated with the emergence of increasingly
authoritarian, hierarchical and anti-competitive forms of political rule
within and between states.
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